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Abstract
There are some statistical anomalies in the Chinese stock market, i.e.,
positive return skewness, anti-leverage effect (positive returns induce higher
volatility than negative returns); and reverse volatility asymmetry (contem-
poraneous return-volatility correlation is positive). In this paper, we first
confirm the existence of these anomalies using daily firm-level stock return
data on the raw returns, excess returns and normalized excess returns. We
empirically show that the asymmetry response of investors to news is one
cause of the statistical anomalies if short sales are constrained. Then in the
context of slow adoption of security lending policy, we conduct panel anal-
ysis and empirically verify that the lifting of short sale constraints leads to
significantly less skewness, less anti-leverage effect and less reverse volatility
asymmetry. Positive skewness is a feature of lottery. Investors are encour-
aged to bet on the upside lottery like potentials in the Chinese markets where
the stocks skew more to the upside when short sales are constrained.
Keywords: short sale constraints, positive skewness, anti-leverage effect,
reverse volatility asymmetry,
1. Introduction
Risk and return are fundamental concepts in finance. For example, the
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) provides for an explicit relationship
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between risk and return by saying that the expected return of an asset is
positively related to its undiversified risk. Accordingly, investors taking on
additional risks should be compensated with higher expected returns. If
the variance and covariance are time-varying, the dynamic nature between
risk and volatility can be complex. Theories such as leverage effect (??)
and volatility-feeback theory (??) are developed to explain the asymmetric
volatility property of individual stock returns in the United States (U.S.)
which says that the stock return volatility is negatively correlated with stock
returns (see e.g., ?).
The leverage effect hypothesis suggests that a drop in the value of a stock
increases the debt-to-equity ratio, this in turn makes the stock riskier and
causes future volatility to rise. Volatility-feedback theory suggests that a
volatility increase raises the expected return, leading to an immediate stock
price decline after investors revalue the equity. The causalities of the two
theories are different: the leverage effect suggests that return shocks lead to
the change of future volatility, while volatility-feedback suggests that current
or future returns are caused by current or lagged volatility shocks. Since
the two effects could happen at intraday sub-timescales, the observation of
contemporaneous return-volatility correlation at a daily level could thus be
caused by either effect or by both effects regardless of any differences in order
of occurrence of return shocks and volatility shocks.
Negative correlation of return and volatility has been observed in most
of the financial markets in developed countries (? (U.S. stock markets), ?
(German stock markets), ? (Japanese stock markets) and ? (Korea stock
markets)). Other researchers such as ??? find a positive relation. ? and ?
argue that either a positive or a negative relationship is possible.
While some researchers are discussing whether the correlation of return
and volatility is negative or which theory seems to offer the best explana-
tions, other studies focusing upon the Chinese markets reveals the existence
of positive return-volatility correlation. Based upon daily raw returns from
four market indices of the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets (taking from May,
1992 to August, 1996 for two composite indices and from October, 1992 to
August, 1996 for two B-share indices), ? find that good news has a larger
impact upon future volatility than bad news. ? examines the log returns
of both Shanghai and Shenzhen Composite Index. He finds a positive and
statistically significant risk-return relationship for the daily returns of stock
indices composed of stocks traded on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange while the
relationship is negative but insignificant for those referencing the Shanghai
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Stock Exchange. ? discover the positive return-volatility correlation in Chi-
nese stock indices using both daily and 5-min data of Chinese stock indices,
compared with the negative correlation founded on German DAX Index.
They refer to this as the anti-leverage effect, and their result is echoed by
?, who use a retarded volatility model and further argue that leverage effect
and the anti-leverage effect are independent of the probability distribution
of returns and long-range time correlation of volatilities. ? review this ef-
fect together with other features of the Chinese stock markets including the
volatility auto-correlation, the return-volatility correlation and the spatial
structure at the firm level. ? confirm the positive correlation using 5-minute
data of 10 individual stocks with high capitalization and high liquidity se-
lected from different industries in the Hushen 300 Index and finds a positive
return-volatility correlation for most of the individual stocks in the sample.
A concept closely related to the dynamic risk-return relationship is the
skewness of returns. If the return-volatility correlation is larger than zero, one
would expect to observe larger magnitudes of positive returns than negative
returns and therefore expect more chances for obtaining extreme positive re-
turns than extreme negative returns. This would lead to a positively skewed
return distribution. In line with the volatility asymmetry, it is a familiar
and stylized fact that stock returns, especially those of large firms, have neg-
ative skewness in developed countries (see ???. However, numerous papers
document the existence of positive return skewness of individual stocks in
China. ? collect daily and weekly return data of market indices and find
that the skewness parameters of the distribution of both risk-adjusted re-
turns and conditional standardized innovations are significantly positive for
both A-shares and B-shares in Shanghai and ShenZhen. ? study a value-
weighted average market capitalization index as well as an equally weighted
index of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares and B-shares based on the daily
returns from December, 1990 to December, 1997 and also finds the existence
of positive skewness. ? explore the ultra-high-frequency data of 23 stocks
traded in the Chinese stock markets in 2003 and achieve similar results.
Possible explanations of the anomalies in the Chinese markets given by
previous researchers are based on indigenous trading mechanisms. ? postu-
late that the Chinese markets protect investors against daily loss by limiting
a stock’s daily range to ±10% of the previous day’s closing price, which re-
duces the risk averse of investors. Few or even no dividends cut down their
motivations for value investment. The majority of the participants are retail
investors who behave like short-term speculators. They surge for a price ris-
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ing trend. ? develop a statistical approach to detect intraday overreaction.
They find that Chinese investors overeact to good news with greater empha-
sis than to bad news, when they are compared with investors in the U.S. and
German markets who overeact with greater emphasis to bad news than to
good news.
However, among all of the empirical studies, few notice the linkage be-
tween short sale constraints and the anomalies observed in Chinese markets.
Two contradicting theories were previously introduced to examine the effects
imposed upon return skewness by short sale constraints. In an effort to ex-
plain market crashes, ? show that based upon the difference among investor
opinions and in the presence of short sale constraints, more information and
thus a larger scale of price adjustment comes out when the market is falling,
which results in negative skewness of a single traded asset, either for an in-
dividual stock or for the market portfolio. Another model developed by ?
predicts that the equilibrium price is a convex function of information when
short sale activity is constrained. He suggests that the market reacts more to
a positive signal than to a negative signal, and that a convex transformation
skews the market return to the right. Therefore, market returns should be
more positively skewed.
Emprical studies seem to be in favor of ?’s model. ? study weekly re-
turns of value-weighted market indices from forty seven equity markets in
the world and find that short sale constraints are associated with less neg-
ative, not more negative, skewness at the market level. In addition, they
find that a severe difference of opinion, proxied by trading volume, would
result in more skewness. ? calculate skewness of weekly raw and excess
returns of more than 12,600 stocks from 26 countries. They use firm-level
lending supply as an indirect proxy for short sale constraints. After conduct-
ing panel regression, they find positive linkage between skewness and short
sale constraints. They also argue that the relaxing of short sale constraints
corrects overpricing and reduces the frequency and magnitude of positive ex-
treme returns and thus leads to lower skewness. Supporting ?, ? show that
when short sale constraints are removed, both raw returns and excess returns
of individual stocks exhibit less positive skewness, based on individual daily
stock return data from Hong Kong. Exploiting the daily returns of ten of the
fifteen off-limits stocks traded on the Paris stock market, ? points out that
the short sale ban increases the uncertainty in the economy and is responsi-
ble for the deterioration of return asymmetry (i.e., the return skewness was
exacerbated). One exception is discovered by ? who study the daily returns
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of 33 constituent stocks of the Taiwan 50 Index Fund and find no significant
difference in return skewness before and after stock short sale constraints are
lifted.
It is worth noting that it is difficult to directly examine the effect of short
sales on return-volatility correlation and skewness, since short sales have
long been practiced in developed markets. To this end, many researchers use
proxies such as relative short interest, breadth of ownership, institutional
ownership for the level of short sale constraints (see ???). The 2008 financial
crisis, during which short sales were banned to different extents among dif-
ferent countries, provides researchers with the opportunity to test the effects
of short sale constraints on pricing efficiency and market stability. Never-
theless, the credence and stability of their results are dampened by the brief
periods of the bans and the limited number of affected stocks (e.g. the short
ban lasted for only 3 weeks in the U.S.). In this respect, the Chinese stock
market is ideal for empirical testing: the launches of margin financing and
security lending for selected stocks naturally divides the time horizon into
two time periods (i.e., before and after the stocks can be sold short). The
fact that stocks can be added to the short sale list only if they meet cer-
tain requirements provides us with a test group as well as a control group
composed of shortable and non-shortable stocks, respectively.
Based on the margin financing and security lending policy, two previous
papers (?,?) studying the effect of short sales focus mainly on market effi-
ciency. The authors find that after the ban is lifted, price efficiency increases
and stock return volatility decreases. In addition, the authors have reported
the change of skewness of raw returns around the addition events (eligible
stocks are added to a designated list for margin-trading and short-selling).
However, their results are in conflict with each other. ? find higher skewness
when short sales are allowed by conducting an event study of 285 additions
between March 31, 2010 and November 25, 2011. Similarly, ? apply an event
study to 511 addition events, between February, 2010 and August, 2013, they
observe lower skewness after short sale constraints are lifted.
The first motive of this paper is to test whether skewness of return dis-
tribution and return-volatility correlation are positive for daily firm-level
returns in the Chinese markets. Most previous studies of the Chinese mar-
kets focus on stock indices (see ??? for return-volatility correlation and ???
for skewness). One contribution of our study to the literature is that we
have a thorough test of the statistics based on raw returns, excess returns
and normalized returns of individual stocks. The excess returns retain the
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idiosyncratic aspects of each stock while the market aspect is removed. The
normalized excess returns, on the other hand, remove the effect of time-
varying volatility and possible leverage (or anti-leverage) effect through di-
viding the excess returns by the conditional volatility obtained from the
EGARCH model.
The second contribution of our study is that we have empirically shown
that short sale constraints are responsible for the existence of positive skew-
ness, anti-leverage effect and reverse volatility asymmetry in the Chinese
markets, based on a panel regression on a wide range of daily return data
covering both shortable and non-shortable stocks spanning from 2006 to 2014
(4 years before and 4 years after the first launch of security lending policy).
Some researchers believe that these statistical anomalies are caused by the
fact that investors in the Chinese markets tend to be speculators and rush
for a price rising (see e.g.??). It is unlikely that Chinese investors are sig-
nificantly different from other investors throughout the world. There should
be some mechanisms built into the markets which offer the Chinese mar-
ket investors the motivation to behave differently. In this paper, we present
evidence that one possible mechanism to explain the statistical anomalies
resides within the policy of the short sale constraints. When the short sales
are constrained, investors tend to rush for a price rising hoping to make prof-
its since they can only buy low and sell high. As a result, we can observe
that the market reacts more to a positive signal than to a negative signal,
and hence the presence of positive skewness, anti-leverage effect, and reverse
volatility asymmetry.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: part 2 gives a brief
description of the data set; part 3 presents the data processing method and
empirical results; part 4 is the conclusion and discussion.
2. Data
We collect Chinese stock data and the designated short sale list from the
GuoTaiAn database. We only keep data on A-share stocks traded on the
Chinese main board. We exclude the stocks traded in the China Growth
Enterprise Market which begin its trading activities on October 23, 2009,
significantly after the moment of our earliest data selection. Turnover rate
data and the FAMA three-factor data are obtained from the Wind Investor
Terminal (WIT).
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Short sale practices started on March 31, 2010 in China. Only a list of
designated securities that meet certain requirements can be sold short. Up
to March 31, 2014, there are 756 securities allowed for short sale through
the margin trading and security lending policy, including 742 stocks and 14
ETFs listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. There are a
total of 2,674 A-share stocks traded on the Chinese main board up to March
31, 2014. Among them, 742 stocks are on the designated list, and 1,932
stocks are not. Table 1 reports the timeline of the gradual lift of the short
sale ban in China. Similar to ?, we organize the table according to the events
in which stocks are added to or deleted from the designated list. We have a
longer list than reported by ? since more events are now available. As we
can see from the table, the adoption of the security lending policy takes a
rather long time, which gives us enough time and data to test the effects of
the policy.
There are 2,674 A-share stocks in total in our samples as of March 31,
2014. Starting from January 1, 2002, four years of data are rolled to estimate
the FAMA three-factor model to obtain excess returns. Thus the actual
effective period is January, 2006 to March, 2012, eight years in total; four
years before the launch of margin financing and security lending, and four
years after that. Only those stocks with more than sixty days of data are
kept after the calculation of excess returns. Thus, we end up with 1,357
stocks in our samples (640 are on the designated list and 717 are not). For
comparison, we choose 3,023 stocks in the Russel-3000 index, traded in the
U.S. markets for comparison. After the excess returns are calculated, we end
up with 2,552 stocks in our samples for the U.S. Markets. The FAMA three
factor data is obtained from French’s website1.
3. Empirical study
In this section, we want to show empirically that positive skewness of
return distribution, anti-leverage effect, and the reverse volatility asymmetry
(positive return and risk correlation) in the Chinese financial markets are all
caused at least partially by short sale constraints. First, we present the data
processing method.
1http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html
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Table 1: The table reports the statistics on the events in which stocks in the Chinese
markets are allowed for short sale. Effective date is the day on which the short sale can
actually be practiced for those stocks on the list.
Effective date No. added No. deleted No. on list
2010/03/31 90 - 90
2010/07/01 5 5 90
2010/07/29 1 1 90
2011/12/05 189 1 278
2012/06/04 2 - 280
2012/10/29 1 - 281
2013/01/31 276 - 557
2013/03/06 - 1 556
2013/03/07 - 1 555
2013/03/26 - 2 553
2013/03/29 1 2 552
2013/04/10 1 - 553
2013/04/24 1 - 554
2013/05/02 - 1 553
2013/05/03 - 1 552
2013/05/27 1 - 553
2013/07/25 1 - 554
2013/08/05 - 2 552
2013/09/16 205 - 757
2013/12/04 1 - 758
Cumulated 775 17 758
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3.1. Data processing
In order to confirm the existence and the robustness of positive skewness
as well as positive risk-return correlation in the Chinese markets, we conduct
our experiment on the raw stock returns, excess returns, and normalized
excess returns.
Excess return is obtained from the FAMA three-factor model for each
individual stock.
ǫt = yt − (α+ β1rt1 + β2rt2 + β3rt3) (1)
where ǫt is the excess return (or innovation), r1, r2 and r3 respectively, rep-
resent one of the FAMA three factors, namely market return, market capi-
talization, and price-to-book ratio. The parameters α and βs are estimated
from a four-year rolling time window and the excess return is computed for
the next one quarter. In this way, the parameters are gradually adapted and
do not cause large disruption to ǫt.
We then normalize the excess return by dividing its conditional standard
deviation obtained from the EGARCH model. We assume that ǫt is sampled
from a normal distribution N (0, σ2
t
). For the evolution equation of σ2
t
, as has
been documented by many researchers to be suitable for the financial time
series in the Chinese markets, the EGARCH (1, 1) model is deployed here
to estimate the variances of residuals.
log σ2
t
= κ+ γ1 log σ
2
t−1 + η1[
|ǫt−1|
σt−1
−
√
2
π
] + ξ1(
ǫt−1
σt−1
) (2)
ǫ′
t
= ǫt/σt (3)
where ǫ′
t
is the normalized excess return.
The excess return ǫt keeps the idiosyncratic innovations of each stock
while the market part is removed. The normalization of excess return re-
moves the effect of time-varying volatility by dividing the conditional volatil-
ity estimated from the EGARCH model. The other advantage of the nor-
malization is that the leverage effect has also been removed after the excess
return is normalized by the EGARCH model, which has a leverage term.
By the assumption of the EGARCH model, we know that even if a leverage
or an anti-leverage effect is present, ǫt is still symmetrically distributed if it
is sampled from N (0, σ2
t
). Therefore, if we can still observe asymmetry in
the normalized excess returns, the asymmetry is not due to the leverage or
anti-leverage effect described in the EGARCH model.
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Figure 1: The probability density and distribution function of normalized excess returns.
The left side graph is the probability density function and the right side graph is the
distribution function. The dotted line in the right graph is the reflection of the distribution
function of the right tail, which is heavier than the left tail.
3.2. Statistics of Overall Markets
In this section, we present some stylized statistical facts in the Chinese
markets in comparison with the U.S. markets.
First, we demonstrate graphically that the distribution of daily firm-level
returns in the Chinese markets is positively skewed. The daily normalized
excess returns are accumulated for all stocks (regardless of whether the stocks
are on the designated list for short sales). The probability distribution and
the distribution function are plotted in Figure 1. We can clearly see from
the Figure that the right tail of the distribution is heavier and therefore the
returns are positively skewed.
We then numerically calculate skewness, leverage coefficent ξ1 and return-
volatility correlation for stocks traded in both the Chinese and the U.S.
markets. Skewness reported in this study is normalized skewness (i.e., the
third centered moment normalized by the standard deviation cubed). All of
the statistics are calculated first on daily returns for each stock, then the
mean and median are estimated to test whether the statistics are larger or
smaller than zero. Skewness is calculated in three different ways: namely,
skewness of the raw returns, skewness of the excess returns, and skewness of
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the normalized excess returns. The skewness of excess returns captures the
asymmetry of excess returns of each stock after the market part is removed.
The skewness of normalized excess return captures the asymmetry of excess
returns after the time-varying volatility and leverage effects are removed.
As the first measurement of the risk-return relationship, the leverage co-
efficient ξ1 in the EGARCH model is deployed as a proxy. The leverage
coefficient captures the change of future volatility caused by past returns.
Then we compute the daily contemporaneous return-volatility correlation
directly (i.e., both return and volatility are employed for the same day). The
absolute value of the daily return is used to proxy for the contemporaneous
volatility.
The results of the descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2. In China,
the mean and median of skewness are both positive at a 1% significance
level, which confirms the positive skewness we have observed in Figure 1.
Note that the skewness of the aggregate market returns is usually negative.
For example, the skewness of the value weighted market returns is -0.32
(not reported in the Table 2) for the same time period. After removing the
negative part of the aggregate market, the skewness of the excess returns of
individual stocks is much higher than that of the raw returns. The origin
of the positive skewness comes from the idiosyncratic innovations of stocks.
The skewness of excess returns and normalized excess returns are close in
their values. The removal of time-varying volatility and leverage effect has
little impact upon the skewness after the time-varying volatility and leverage
effect are removed. As a sharp contrast, both mean and median of skewness
are negative at a 1% level in the U.S. markets. It has been reported in ?
that the average skewness is positive. The possible reasons for the difference
are: (i) The average value of non-normalized skewness (not divided by the
standard deviation cubed) is reported in their study. Small firms tend to be
more volatile and have returns with higher positive non-normalized skewness.
Thus, small firms have dominating weights when an average is taken together
with both large firms and small firms included; (ii) our research uses the top
3000 stocks as in the Ruessel index so that we have a comparable number
of stocks and market capitalization for the two countries. Thus, we have a
lesser number of small firms included in our study while they use all stocks
in the CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices) database. It should
be noted that although we calculate the statistics for the whole time period,
the results are similar if we divide the data into half-year time windows (not
reported).
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As for the risk-return relationship, positive mean and median leverage
coefficients indicate that we have an anti-leverage effect in China in contrast
with a leverage effect in the U.S. In addition, the contemporaneous return-
volatility correlation is also positive in China. The results in the U.S. show
no significant difference from zero.
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Table 2: The table reports the overall descriptive statistics of daily firm-level return in China and the U.S.. The skewness
is measured for the raw return, excess return and normalized excess return for each stock. The leverage coefficient ξ1 in the
EGARCH model is deployed to measure the leverage (or anti-leverage) effect. Contemporaneous correlation of return and its
absolute value is reported to measure the volatility asymmetry. A T-test and a signed rank test are, respectively, used to test
the sign of mean and median. In China, we have positive values for skewness, leverage coefficient, and risk-return correlation.
However, in the U.S., skewness and leverage coefficients are both negative.
skewness leverage return-volatility correlation
raw excess normalized coefficient raw excess
mean(C) 0.69∗∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗ 1.24∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
mean(U) −0.23∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.0038 0.0052∗
median(C) 0.075∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗
median(U) −0.067∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ 0.0017 0.01∗∗∗
Note:Triple asterisks(***)denote significance at 1% critical level, double asterisks(**) at 5% level, and single aster-
isks(*) at 10% level, respectively. C stands for China and U stands for the United States. Norm. is the abbreviation
of normalized returns.
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3.3. Effects of short sales in skewness and risk-return relationship
Up to this point, we have observed that the Chinese markets are unique
and they have quite different statistics. Some researchers believe that this is
due to the fact that investors in the Chinese markets tend to be speculators
and rush for a price rising (see e.g.??). We believe that it is unlikely that
Chinese investors are significantly different from other investors throughout
the world. There should be some mechanisms built into the markets which
offer Chinese investors the motivation to behave differently. In this part,
we present evidence that one possible mechanism to explain the statistical
anomalies resides within the short sale constraints.
The usual way to study the effect of short sale constraints is to take only
a few dozen days around the events and thus the time effect and other market
events may not be distracting issues. In our study, the time span is rather
long (i.e., four years before the first launch of security lending policy and four
years after). In order to exclude the possibility that positive skewness, anti-
leverage effect and positive return-volatility correlation are caused by factors
other than the short sale constraints, we include those stocks which are not
yet eligible for short sales for comparison (thanks to the slow adjustment
of the security lending policy). Therefore, we divide the stocks into two
groups, namely, Group 1 which includes stocks that are selected for short
sales practice at least once as of March 31, 2014, and Group 2 which includes
stocks that are never eligible for short sales.
From Figure 2, we see a significant decrease in the skewness of returns for
stocks in Group 1 after short sales are practiced, and the difference is most
significant for daily returns. Looking at the results of Group 1 alone, the
drop in the skewness may be caused by other reasons or by mere time effect.
In contrast, the two intertwined lines at the top show that the skewness of
stocks in Group 2 does not change much after the security lending policy is
adopted. This result leads us to believe that short sale constraints should
be responsible for return asymmetry, since skewness remains the same in
the presence of short sale constraints for Group 2, while return asymmetry
is largely ameliorated after the constraints are lifted. In addition, for both
Group 1 and Group 2, skewness decreases gradually as the return interval
increases, meaning that the deviance of positive and negative normalized
excess returns is getting closer. The asymmetry of the price response to good
news and to bad news starts to weaken after a couple of days but still persists
even after 2 weeks (10 trading days). The persistence of positive skewness
in the Chinese markets may be caused by the inadequate scale of short sale
14
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Figure 2: The average skewness and its sample standard deviation (divided by the square
root of sample size minus 1) as the function of return intervals. Group 1 refers to the
stocks which are on the designated list at least once as of March 31, 2014, Group 2 refers
to the stocks which are not. The bottom line presents the skewness of Group 1 after short
sales are practice. The second line from the bottom presents the skewness of normalized
excess return of Group 1 before they can be shorted. Since stocks in Group 2 do not have
an initiating date for short sale, the top two lines stand for the skewness of their returns
before and after the first launch of the security lending policy on March 31, 2010. Error
bars denotes one standard deviation range of skewness.
(e.g., on March 31, 2014, the outstanding short interest is only 5 billion RMB
while the outstanding margin finance is 700 billion RMB) or other structural
reasons of the market. From the observation that the skewness gradually
drops if we extend the measurement window of returns, we can conclude
that the asymmetry of returns is not caused by the possibility that there
is more or stronger good news than bad news in the Chinese markets. It
is the asymmetry of response of the market to the news which leads to the
asymmetry of returns.
Similar to the case for skewness, in Figure 3 we report a significant de-
crease in the return-volatility correlation for Group 1 after short sales are
practiced. In contrast, the two intertwined lines at the top show that the
volatility-return correlation of Group 2 does not change much after the im-
plementation of the security lending policy since they are excluded from the
designated list.
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Figure 3: The average correlation of return-volatility correlation (excess returns) and its
sample standard deviation (divided by the square root of sample size minus 1) as the
function of return intervals. Group 1 refers to the stocks which are on the designated list
at least once as of March 31, 2014, Group 2 refers to the stocks which are not. The bottom
line presents the correlation of Group 1 after short sales are practiced. The second line
from the bottom presents the correlation of normalized excess return of Group 1 before
they can actually be shorted. Since stocks in Group 2 do not have an initiating date for
short sale, the top two lines stand for the correlation of their returns before and after
the first launch of the security lending policy on March 31, 2010. Error bars denotes one
standard deviation range of correlation.
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3.4. Panel Regression
We have described the decrease of skewness and return-volatility corre-
lation as a result of the security lending policy in China in Figure 2 and 3.
We depict the dramatic change of the considered statistics before and after
short sale practice for stocks allowed for short sales in group 1, in contrast to
the unnoticed change for stocks not eligible for short sales in group 2. The
possibility still exists that this phenomenon might be caused by the mere
passage of time or other endogenous factors which we have not been able
to identify. Therefore, we formalize the problem in the framework of panel
regression for more rigorous analysis.
We use all the statistics as the dependent variables in Table 2, namely the
skewness of three different measures, leverage coefficient ξ1 in the EGARCH
model, and two return-volatility correlations. Explanatory variables include
turnover rate (which is the ratio of daily volume to shares outstanding) to
proxy for the difference of opinions, return and volatility for each stock, a
dummy variable v to represent group 1 or group 2 and a dummy variable
u to represent short sale practiced. The other two sets of dummy variables
account for the fixed effects of industry and time. There are 13 industry
categories in total according to the national 2001 criteria of stock classifica-
tion of the CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission). The number
of time windows depends on how we prepare our samples.
All dependent variables and explanatory variables are estimated in non-
overlapping time windows spanning from January 1, 2006 to March 31, 2014.
As a robustness check, we use two time windows to prepare the samples
(i.e., quarterly and half-year time windows). If the samples are calculated
for every quarter, there are 33 samples for each stock, denoting 33 quarters
from January 1, 2006 to March 31, 2014. If we prepare the samples for every
half-year, then there are 17 samples.
The regression equation is given as,
yit = αI + γt + βTTit + βrrit + βσσit + βvvi + βuuit (4)
where y is one of the 5 dependent variables, αI and γt is the fixed effects
of industry and time, respectively. Tit, rit and σit represent the turnover
rate, return and volatility of stock i in time window t, respectively. Dummy
variable vi = 1 means stock i is in group 1, and uit = 1 means stock i can be
sold short in time window t. As we have noticed in Table 1, the designated
list is frequently adjusted. Some stocks are later included again after they
have been removed. Remember that group 1 refers to stocks that are selected
for short sales practice at least once as of March 31, 2014. There are stocks
in group 1 which are not practiced for short sales yet in time window t. But
for those stocks in group 2 (vi = 0), we always have uit = 0. To determine
whether a stock in group 1 is practiced for short sale or not, we count the
actual number of days for each stock in each time window. If a stock is
eligible for short selling for more than half of the days in the given time
window, we treat it as a sample with short sale practiced.
The regression results are reported in Table 3 and Table 4 for quarterly
and half-year sampling periods, respectively. The results are similar despite
the sampling windows. As shown in the Tables, all dependent variables
except for the skewness of raw returns decreased significantly at a 1% level
after short sale is practiced. These results give the direct evidence to support
our hypothesis that the short sale constraint is responsible for the statistical
anomalies we have observed in the Chinese markets. The skewness of raw
returns also decreases but to a lesser degree, which could explain why we have
conflicting results in ? and ? as they report the skewness of raw returns.
Turnover rate (the proxy for difference of opinion) positively contributes
to the dependent variables in accordance with the proposition made by ?:
that difference of opinion results in higher skewness. It is interesting to note
that the contribution of return to dependent variables is positive (i.e., we
expect to get higher skewness, stronger anti-leverage effect and higher risk-
return correlation when the price of a stock is pumped up). This could be
explained by the price chasing behaviors of investors in China. When the
short sales are constrained, investors would rush for price rising to make
profits since they can only buy low and sell high (they can not sell high and
buy low). The results are inconclusive for volatility.
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Table 3: The table reports the regression conducted on quarterly samples if there are more than 40 observations in a quarter.
Dependent variables are skewness of raw returns, excess returns, normalized excess return, leverage coefficient ξ1 in EGARCH
model, return-volatility correlation calculated for raw returns and excess returns, respectively. Explanatory variables include,
average daily turnover in a quarter, cumulative return and standard deviation of daily return in a quarter, a dummy variable
for designated list, and a dummy variable for short sale practice. All regressions include dummies (unreported) for each quarter
and industry.
skewness leverage return-volatility correlation
raw excess normalized coefficient raw excess
turnover rate 0.0076*** 0.031*** 0.037*** 0.014*** 0.022*** 0.021***
(4.48) (13.12) (13.44) (12.71) (27.22) (22.02)
return 0.010*** 0.021*** 0.041*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.03***
(5.91) (8.50) (14.95) (6.10) (11.81) (31.22)
volatility 0.78** -0.10** -0.078*** 0.03 0.77*** -0.29
(2.22) (-2.03) (-3.20) (0.13) (4.68) (-1.49)
designated list 0.070*** -0.053*** -0.078*** -0.026*** 0.060*** -0.0062*
(11.54) (-6.25) (-8.08) (-7.01) (21.65) (-1.88)
short sale practiced -0.017 -0.056*** -0.081*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.014**
(-1.55) (-3.60) (-4.60) (-3.90) (-5.29) (-2.37)
Obj. 38142 38142 38142 38142 38142 38142
Stocks 1357 1357 1357 1357 1357 1357
R-square adjusted 0.071 0.044 0.049 0.027 0.30 0.091
F-statistics 59.12 35.53 39.98 19.77 307.59 77.38
Time fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note:Triple asterisks(***)denote significance at 1% critical level, double asterisks(**) at 5% level, and single
asterisks(*) at 10% level respectively.
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Table 4: The table reports the regression conducted on half year samples if there are more than 40 observations in half year.
Dependent variables are skewness of raw returns, excess returns, normalized excess return, leverage coefficient ξ1 in EGARCH
model, return-volatility correlation calculated for raw returns and excess returns, respectively. Explanatory variables include,
average daily turnover in half a year, cumulative return and standard deviation of daily return in half a year, a dummy variable
for designated list, and a dummy variable for short sale practice. All regressions include dummies (unreported) for each half
year and industry.
skewness leverage return-volatility correlation
raw excess normalized coefficient raw excess
turnover rate -0.0073*** 0.022*** 0.027*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.016***
(-2.60) (5.67) (6.26) (10.32) (10.49) (13.15)
return 0.0055*** 0.020*** 0.036*** 0.0058*** 0.0055*** 0.022***
(2.98) (7.84) (12.92) (7.042) (8.72) (27.62)
volatility 1.53*** -0.96 -1.44* -0.15 1.51*** 0.0093
(2.88) (-1.34) (-1.81) (-0.61) (7.98) (0.041)
designated list 0.064*** -0.065*** -0.084*** -0.021*** 0.053*** -0.0058
(6.88) (-5.22) (-6.00) (-4.97) (16.40) (-1.49)
short sale practiced -0.029* -0.08*** -0.12*** -0.025*** -0.036*** -0.023***
(-1.82) (-3.72) (-4.99) (-3.41) (-6.46) (-3.39)
Obj. 19372 19372 19372 19372 19372 19372
No. of Stocks 1357 1357 1357 1357 1357 1357
R-square adjusted 0.061 0.044 0.051 0.025 0.30 0.11
F-statistics 38.78 27.27 31.83 14.62 249.39 70.42
Time fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note:Triple asterisks(***)denote significance at 1% critical level, double asterisks(**) at 5% level, and single
asterisks(*) at 10% level respectively.
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4. Discussion and conclusion
Some statistical anomalies, including positive skewness, anti-leverage ef-
fect and reverse volatility asymmetry (positive return-volatility correlation)
have been documented on daily firm-level data on the Chinese stock mar-
ket. We show empirically that short sale constraints are responsible for these
anomalies.
We first examine the skewness of daily firm-level returns in the Chinese
stock market. The skewness of raw returns, excess returns and normalized
excess returns are all positive in that the mean and median of skewness are
statistically significantly positive. The skewness of the three returns captures
different statistical aspects of the market. The skewness of the excess returns
is particularly significantly positive in both its mean and median after the
market part is removed. The effect of time-varying volatility and leverage (or
anti-leverage) effects are removed after we normalize the excess returns using
the conditional volatility generated by the EGARCH model. The skewness
changes very little after the excess returns are normalized, suggesting that
the time-varying volatility and leverage (or anti-leverage) effect are not the
cause of positive skewness of excess returns.
As for the risk-return relationship, the positive mean and median of the
leverage coefficient of the EGARCH model indicates that we have an anti-
leverage effect in the Chinese markets. The leverage coefficient measures
the effect of lagged returns on future volatility. Anti-leverage effect means
that positive returns induce higher volatility than negative returns. Contem-
poraneous return-volatility correlation, however, captures the simultaneous
co-movement of returns and volatility at a daily level although the dynamic
nature of the interaction can be complex at the intraday level. If the contem-
poraneous correlation of return and volatility is larger than zero, we would
expect to get larger returns when the returns are positive than when the
returns are negative and therefore, positive skewness is a direct consequence
of the positive return-volatility correlation.
The two theories (i.e., the leverage effect and volatility feedback effect)
developed to explain the leverage effect and volatility asymmetry in the U.S.
markets apparently do not apply to the Chinese markets. In this study,
we empirically verify that the positive skewness is caused by the short sale
constraints as an empirical support to the model developed by Xu(2007).
We also provide evidence that the anti-leverage effect and positive return-
volatility correlation are also caused by short sale constraints.
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Starting from March, 2010, China adopts the margin finance and security
lending policy. The policy provides for a designated list of stocks for short sale
practice. The adoption of the security lending policy takes place over time
and it is still in process. This affords us sufficient time space from which to
collect data to examine the effects of the policy. We divide the Chinese stocks
into two groups, namely Group 1 and Group 2. Group 1 includes stocks that
are selected for short sales practice at least once as of March 31, 2014; Group
2 includes stocks that are never eligible for short sales. Graphically, we show
a significant reduction of the skewness and return-volatility correlation for
the stocks in Group 1 after the short sales are practiced. In addition, we
show that the skewness and return-volatility correlation also gradually drop
if we extend the measurement window of returns from 1 day to 10 days. This
suggests that the asymmetry of returns is not caused by the possibility that in
the Chinese markets we are populated with more good news or the intensity of
good news is stronger than bad news. It is, rather, the asymmetric response
of the market to the news which causes the asymmetry of returns.
We then conduct panel regression using daily return data of stocks allowed
for short sale after they are added to a designated list and of other stocks
never added to the list. Our results show that (i) the lifting of short sale
constraints largely not only decreases the skewness of the raw returns, excess
returns and normalized excess returns, but also decreases the anti-leverage
effect and reverse volatility asymmetry; (ii) the skewness, anti-leverage effect,
and reverse volatility asymmetry are all positively correlated with turnover
rate (proxy of difference of opinion), and with contemporaneous returns.
Positively skewed securities are like lotteries. ? show that investors are
skewness seekers if they obey prospect theory (?). Chinese investors would
rather pay high prices to hold securities with high skewness and treat those
stocks as lotteries. It has been shown by many researchers (see e.g., ?) that
there exists obvious lottery preference in the Chinese markets. The significant
positive skewness of returns provides investors with the motive to chase for
lottery-like stocks. Investors are encouraged to bet on the continuation of
price rising in the Chinese markets where the stock price returns skew more
to the upside when short sales are constrained.
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